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In this brief contribution we focus on the co-evolution of cybercrime and cybersecurity 
practices in the banking and financial sector. We draw on previous studies on outlaw innovation 
and organizational morphing to reconstruct the parallel and mutually influenced evolution of the 
bright and dark side of financial services. We identify five phases from the late 90s to the post-
2015 period that show the paired configuration in actors, techniques, collaborative actions, and 
venues in the morphing of the two opposing sides. This paper constitutes the first step towards a 
broader empirical analysis on the generativity of opposing forces in digital ecosystems.  
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Financial cybercrimes are profit-driven forms of crimes such as phishing and ransomware 
attacks aimed at misappropriating value through the malicious use of digital technologies 
(Baskerville et al. 2014; Pienta et al. 2020). Malicious actors harness and exploit digital 
technologies aiming for the sake of misappropriation of value, producing a set of new forms of 
cybercrime as the results of an outlaw innovation process in the dark (Flowers 2008). Financial 
cybercrimes considerably affect the bright side of the banking and financial sector. In fact, such 
criminal practices have become increasingly problematic over the last 25 years, with the advent 
of online banking and the proliferation of electronic funds transfer systems (Leukfeldt et al. 
2017). To protect banks and financial services’ customers from the threat of cybercrime, 
cybersecurity practices are performed by multiple actors at different levels of the bright side 
(Calderaro and Craig 2020; Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).  
In this brief contribution we investigate the existence of a link between the evolution of 
cybercrime and cybersecurity institutions in the banking and financial sector. As proposed by 
Flowers (2008), there is a linkage between innovations in the bright and in the dark side. Here, 
we argue that this linkage is not solely observable in technical innovation, but also in the 
evolution of institutional forms. In simple terms, drivers of organizational change of the two 
sides of financial services are hardly independent from each other as they need to account for the 
variations in the counterparts. We frame this reactive behavior of adaptation as a form of 
continuous morphing (Rindova and Kotha 2001) driven by systemic conditions and instantiated 
in the digital ecosystem where actors operate and mutate to match the shifting market conditions. 
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In short, bright and dark actors use morphing to keep a competitive edge in their environment. 
We look at the institutional forms in these opposing domains proposing that they can capture 
structural changes and responses (Vial 2019) of bright and dark actors modifying their value 
appropriation/misappropriation paths. In this paper, we offer a first example of an integrated 
view that suggests how the aforementioned tension shapes the continuous morphing of 
institutional forms in digital ecosystems (Alaimo et al. 2019). Therefore, our research question 
is: how cybercrime and cybersecurity institutions co-evolve in financial services ecosystems? 
To reconstruct the parallel and mutually influenced evolution of the bright and dark side, we 
focus on information security and financial cybercrime practices respectively. This choice 
illustrates how competing actors who share the same ecosystem forge their value-creation paths 
in a reactive fashion and adopt institutional forms that best fit two stimuli: (1) counterparts’ 
practices and (2) evolving systemic features (including technologies and their constraints). We 
identify five phases from the later 90s to the post-2015 period that show the paired configuration 
in actors, techniques, collaborative actions and venues in the morphing of the two opposing 
sides.  
INSTITUTIONAL FORMS IN THE BRIGHT AND DARK SIDE OF FINANCIAL 
SERVICES ECOSYSTEM 
The financial service ecosystem witness the competing activities and organizing of two 
counterparts: “bright” actors – in the form of legitimate organizations operating in the 
environment – and “dark” actors - broadly defined as cybercriminals or outlaw users (Flowers 
2008). The tension between the two groups originates in colliding goals of appropriation and 
misappropriation of value, taking place in the environment in which they operate. In the security 
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domain, few studies have been looking at the effect of deterrence generated by legislation and 
institutions (Kim et al. 2012). Hui et al. (2017) estimate the effect of the Convention on 
Cybercrime on cyber-attack suggesting that – despite its merits – cybercriminals may adapt to 
these countermeasures and divert their attention to non-enforcing countries. This portrays dark 
actors as adaptable entities that can adjust their behaviors not only based on the feature of their 
environment, but also reacting to their “foes”.  
The open-ended nature of digital infrastructures, offers “dark” actors new opportunities to 
capture value through deception (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2003). The growth of cyber threats 
shows that digital resources can serve as enabling tools for value misappropriation. Again, the 
process of misappropriation is hardly static: cybercriminals have been evolving over time at the 
individual levels and in their institutional forms. There has been a progressive 
professionalization of “hackers” (Flowers 2008): they departed from the original connotation of 
“modders” or “product hackers” which characterized the first wave of the phenomenon. Said 
evolution most likely depended in first place by the opportunities offered by the environment in 
which they operated. Yet, it became soon after a by-product of reactive behavior to opposing 
actors. In first place, resilience of criminal organizations carries over from “offline” instances 
crime  (Agreste et al. 2016). Secondly, studies on organizational forms of cybercrime – such as 
the ones on Online Black Markets (OBMs) – have shown a high level of resilience of these 
platforms vis-à-vis the intervention of LEAs (Paolo Spagnoletti et al. 2018). The dark side is in 
fact particularly able to adapt and overcome challenges by re-organizing benefitting from its 
“less institutionalized” nature. This feature is embodied by a continuous morphing of 
institutional forms and organizational arrangements of malicious actors (Ceci et al. 2018).  
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The literature shows the birth, the evolution and the end of bright and dark actors organising 
under different perspectives, but to date few frameworks consider their interplay and the effect 
on value creation at ecosystem level. In this paper, we develop a five stages model (Figure 1) 
that depicts the co-evolution of cybercrime and cybersecurity institutions in financial 
ecosystems. We illustrate the validity of the model by presenting in the bright side the EU-
OF2CEN (European Union Online Fraud Cyber - Center Expert Network) case, a public-private 
partnerships aimed at contrasting financial cybercrime. In the dark side, on the same timeframe, 
between 2010 and 2015, we observed the evolution of carding in Online Blackmarkets (OBMs). 
 
Figure 1 – Co-evolution of institutional forms in bright and dark side of financial services ecosystems 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: OF2CEN AND CARDING IN OBMS  
The EU-OF2CEN – launched in 2013 - is an online platform that collect in real time, 
through secure communication channels, reports from banks and police on suspicious 
transactions that take place on the Internet, analyze them and share all information with the aim 
of identifying and blocking illegal operations. The platform allows the detection and sharing, 
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through a system of "early warning" of reports related to possible criminal activities in progress. 
The project was conceived by the Italian Police, managed by Polizia Postale Department and 
financed by the European Union. For financial institutions, the birth of such platform translates 
into a significant increase in the ability to assess bank movements and into the subsequent 
implementation of effective actions to prevent or contain fraud or money laundering (Spagnoletti 
and Salvi 2020). For Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), the aggregated analysis of the data 
collected can be used in structured investigative activities to enable more prompt attempts to 
recover from crime and facilitate the identification of responsible. The objectives of the platform 
are twofold: from a strategic viewpoint, the creation of a Public Private Partnership between 
Europol, LEAs and banks, favors the increase of common awareness about the modus operandi 
and criminal trends related to financial cybercrimes, improving cooperation in the action of 
prevention and contrast; from an operational viewpoint, the sharing of relevant data allows to 
increase the ability to evaluate financial transactions carried out with the use of electronic tools, 
at national and international level. This facilitates concrete and timely actions to prevent and 
counter the recurrence of financial cybercrime. Therefore, in the OF2CEN we observe: (i) 
collaboration between IT security units and fraud management units; (ii) involvement of LEAs 
and information sharing between private and public actors; (iii) more capillary monitoring over 
transactions with prompter multi agency communications; (iv) refinement in shared data for anti-
fraud. 
As for the dark side, the timeframe between 2010 and 2015 embodies the raise and growth of 
OBMs. These platforms allowed for a series of low-risk, high-profit criminal activities (i.e. 
carding) that offered relatively easy value misappropriation paths for cyber-criminals in the 
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financial ecosystem. These platforms encompass a wide variety of actors including hackers, site 
administrators, buyers, vendors and undercover LEA’s agents. One of the main categories of 
digital goods pertaining the financial ecosystem listed in OBMs are credit cards details often 
referred to as “carding”. It represents a major threat for businesses in all industrial sectors 
(Kraemer-Mbula et al. 2013; Spagnoletti et al. 2018). The phenomenon has evolved over time 
and OBMs enabled a series of incentives and technical solutions to make these activities low-risk 
and high-rewarding. 
Our analysis of offers published between 2011 and 2016 in the category “digital goods” of major 
OBMs, shows that credit card numbers are sold in a variety of ways and with many additional 
services. Most vendors offer services to check the validity of the cards and commit to replace 
them based on the checker’s result. Other vendors offer packages that guarantee the credit and 
spending balance. Others sell credit cards templates and holograms. Half of the offers are related 
to guides and tutorials explaining how to steal credit card information and how to use stolen 
cards minimizing the risk of being detected. The trade of illegal goods is conducted through 
anonymous transactions and shipping, guaranteed by the use of Tor network. The offer includes 
the display of goods, customer rankings of vendors, payment system (cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin), and escrow functions, similar to those available in conventional e-commerce websites, 
for secure exchange. To build trust, buyers are called to rate vendors. Trust is central for OBMs, 
as we can see from the buyer’s guidelines reported in one OBM: “First of all, all members are 
kindly asked to be honest regarding package, delivery, product quality and shipping conditions. 
This helps maintaining a trusted network, which is a major basis in hidden web marketplaces. 
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Scammers are not tolerated and are quickly identified as such” (http://xsuee6v24g2q6phb.onion/ 
help accessed on Dec 03, 2018). 
Therefore, in the case of carding in OBMs referring to of our model we observe: (i) evolution of 
platforms to end to end services; (ii) collaboration and communication between an array of 
malicious actors: hackers, vendors, figureheads; (iii) more capillary and complex services and 
technological functionalities; (iv) refinement in data for financial fraud 
CONCLUSION 
In this contribution, we focus on the financial services ecosystem to empirically analyze 
the co-evolution of institutional forms that emerge between cybercriminals and legal actors. This 
contribution constitutes the first step towards a broader theoretical understanding of the 
generativity of opposing forces in digital ecosystems.  
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